Why is the garrison of the Brest fortress was not supported by other parts of the red Army

History 03/02/20 Why the garrison of the Brest fortress was not supported by other parts of the red Army

history of the great Patriotic war, even after nearly eight decades shrouded in mystery. Many of them have political and ideological motives are hidden or ignored, some are revealed gradually. For example, only in July 2019, the Ministry of defense of Russia declassified some documents relating to the protection of the Brest fortress. They clarified the fate of many who during the month defended the frontier. Moreover, the recordings became partly clear, which parts and what price were removed from the fire.

Protection without the willingness

Chaotic is the best definition for defense, organized by the Soviet command in the first days of the war. The Germans attacked by surprise not only the leaders, but the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The leader was convinced of the inviolability of the non-aggression Pact with Germany, which from bringing troops to combat readiness, it was decided to refuse, even despite the obvious signs of preparation fascists to attack.

Only at midnight at the headquarters of the Western special military district, major General Alexander Korobkov – the commander of the 4th army, which was located in the area of Brest – gave an informal order to “be ready”. Although precise guidelines are not followed, the military commander, under their own responsibility ordered to be sent to the so-called red packets with instructions on the actions to take on combat alert. The plan is expected, including the movement of units based in Brest and the fortress, in the area of collection and their distribution.

Force has no time

On June 22, 1941, part of the 4th army consisted of the 28th infantry and the 14th mechanized corps, two single – 49th and 75th rifle division of the 62nd Brest fortified area, according to the power value is also equal to the division, and the number of parts. In addition, linkYu was given the 10th mixed air division, which had about 230 serviceable combat aircraft.

Directly in the fortress, to be declassified, the Ministry of defense of the Russian Federation of documents, were the 44th and the 455th infantry regiments (each battalion had already been withdrawn to areas of the building), and 393-th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion and the 4th separate anti-tank battalion of the 42nd infantry division. In the Northern town of Brest, with the exception of two divisions, located 17th howitzer artillery regiment. The citadel was also the 84th, 125th, and 333 th infantry regiments (after all, without one battalion or engineer company), 131st artillery regiment 75th separate reconnaissance battalion of the 98th separate division PTO, staff battery, 37-th separate battalion, 31st avtobatalon and rear units of the 6th infantry division.

however, the Brest fortress was based logistical units, the headquarters of the 33rd district engineer regiment, half of the district military hospital in the island Hospital and a border Outpost on the island Edge. Finally, ring in the Bastion and fortress walls, home to a large number of officers and enlisted with their families, and civilian working in the units and institutions located in the Fort.

ideally all of them, the Soviet command expected to withdraw from the fire. The organization of defense directly to the citadel was not originally intended – it had to postpone it due to unavoidable circumstances.

About 2 a.m. due to wind wire communication headquarters army and district have been violated. Fix it was only 3:30, and immediately the General Korobkov received from the commander of the Western district’s order on bringing troops to combat readiness. The task meant, in particular, the conclusion of the Brest fortress units of the 42nd infantry division, the embattled 22nd and 30th tank and the 205th motorized divisionminutes of the 14th mechanized corps, and moving the aircraft, which was at the border airfields. 3:45 the commander of the 4th army personally on the phone gave the orders. However, to do so before the beginning of the war did not.

about four o’clock in the morning on “maternity” time of the 42nd infantry division Korobkov reported that the enemy started an artillery bombardment of Brest. After this they were ordered to bring in the combat readiness of all troops of the 4th army, but because of problems with communication in the end to declare it had personally the commanders of parts and connections of the 14th mechanized corps of the order was executed after 4:30 — team from the County.

Betrayal, negligence or the inevitable?

what happened next was more like a massacre. The most powerful fire the Germans fired on military camps and especially in the Brest fortress. The main targets became the barracks and officers houses, bridges and gates of the citadel. To get out of the fortress and get to the gathering place of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions from the dense fire are unable. The only way out of the Northern gate was under constant enemy artillery strikes, so out was only some of the units, and that without equipment and weapons. The rest of the parts are actually trapped in the fortress, and other variants, except how to defend, they have no choice.

the Complicated situation and the fact that after the start of shelling of the city remained without electricity and communications. Everything else is a substantial part of the command structure — up to 30-40 per cent were in hostel fortress was destroyed, and the officers that survived, could not get to their parts. As a result, coordination between the red army were absent, and scattered units of divisions of Brest the two were mixed.

the Departure of the 22nd tank division left the city virtually unprotected. However, part of the units were not in the best situation: as of 7 a.m., the Brest, excleniem fortress, was completely in the hands of the enemy, the personnel under enemy fire randomly crossed the river Mukhavets to the South-East of Brest and suffered heavy losses. However in the first hours of the war no one thought, because a full picture of what is happening was not.

Realizing, apparently, it’s only a couple of weeks. July 4 was arrested the commander of the Western special military district, Colonel General Dmitry Pavlov, the commander of the 42nd infantry division major-General Ivan Lazarenko, 8 July — commander of the 4th army, major-General Alexander Korobkov. It is they, the Soviet leadership blamed the failure of the first days of the war. While initially the military was scheduled to be tried for treason, but after a short trial the verdict was for negligence.

Pavlov and the box was shot. Lazarenko, and initially sentenced to death, escaped 10 years of camps. In 1942 he was returned to service. He died in June 1944 by a direct hit of a shell in his car. Later all three were rehabilitated, but does this mean that they are not to blame?

Ivan Resepi

© Russian Seven

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