Russia’s intervention in Mali has put Germany in a dilemma. This spurred Mali on to go on a confrontation with Germany, which would also make a European withdrawal appear as a defeat against Russia. Moscow may not have planned it that way, but the situation is now turning very much in Russia’s favour. The Kremlin is on track to kill two birds with one stone: it encourages Bamako to end the European operation in Mali and wins a monopoly on foreign influence in the resulting vacuum.
A pattern can be discerned in Russia’s numerous deployments to unstable regions of Africa since 2017. Where Europe takes on the role of stabilization and peacekeeping in Africa, Russia exploits frictions that arise between Europe and host country governments due to differing approaches. Where Europe relies on values, a rules-based approach and prudent measures to protect its own armed forces, Russia takes sides and offers unconditional support.
Berlin is now playing a crucial role in Mali because Paris recently withdrew the last French troops from the country. Germany’s decision on whether and how to maintain its presence in Mali shapes European military support for the UN mission Minusma. In May 2022, the Bundestag extended the mandate of its bilateral engagement in Mali, but geared it towards supporting Minusma – other European countries followed suit. Should Germany end its mission, other European countries will also seek to exit.
The trap Germany now finds itself in stems from last year’s heated dispute between the Malian junta and France. France’s condemnation of the junta’s seizure of power and its positive attitude towards Russia’s role ultimately led to the expulsion of the French ambassador to Mali. But while the junta directed its hostility primarily towards Paris, the dispute also affected Bamako’s relations with other European capitals, which had to show solidarity with France.
The junta has now started using its control over access to Mali to harass Europe. Bamako is not yet ready to reject Europa and Minsuma outright, but it is becoming increasingly assertive, disrupting logistical support for the mission in annoying and bureaucratic ways. The fact that the junta blocked a German troop rotation flight and prevented German troops from boarding a civilian plane in Bamako are just two recent examples.
Moscow plays a key role in this, with its support emboldening Bamako. The junta is no longer solely dependent on European military support and feels empowered to confront Europe. However, the deeper strategic interests of Mali and Russia are far apart. From Mali’s point of view, it would be wise to involve both Russia and Europe and pit them against each other to get the maximum benefit. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to get the junta to provoke the Europeans into withdrawing from Mali.
So the Kremlin has put the Europeans in a quandary: staying in Mali is becoming increasingly difficult. A deduction, however, seems to mean accepting defeat. This also explains the decision of the Bundestag in May. With Germany ending its direct involvement in Mali while remaining in the country via Minusma, Berlin chose to hide and wait for things to change.
One presumably hopes that given enough leeway, the Russians will discredit themselves — for example, by committing crimes against the Malians they claim to protect, or by exploiting Mali’s resources in a way that provokes popular backlash. Then, under the junta or another government, Europe could be back in Bamako’s favor.
Meanwhile, Europe plans to conduct even more stabilization and peacekeeping operations in this unstable region that stretches across the Sahel towards the Atlantic. At the same time, it can be expected that Russia will continue to try to expel Europeans from various African countries. So what Europe is doing in Mali has consequences beyond its borders: it will set a precedent for existing and future operations.
The only 100 percent guarantee of European influence is that one country denies Russia access in the first place. However, Europe may not be able to achieve this without falling into a downward spiral and abandoning its values ​​in order to provide unconditional military support to authoritarian leaders.
Europe’s support may be conditional, but it is better in quality and quantity than Russia’s. For the African states of this unstable region, the loss of European support therefore comes at a real cost. But Europe may have to demonstrate its willingness to withdraw before countries in the region are ready to face the consequences. In this sense, Europe may have to sacrifice its presence in Mali for the sake of regional stability.
