statistics are as clear as this: Of the 22 Islamist suicide attacks in the EU since 2014, all 22 are known to have been executed by at least one police, affinity to violence perpetrators. All, 100 percent.

today, the second anniversary of the Islamist assassination of anise Amri, I would like to write a little more personal Text, without leaving me with anger. Not so easy with a 100-percent rate.

at the Latest since the Snowden revelations, I follow the activities of the security agencies (especially the intelligence services) intensive. In 2016 and 2017, I have already created similar statistics, because I noticed that so many of the Islamist murderers were already in front of their deeds officially known. So that the state is seeking, among other things, with the help of the data retention monitor of the phone calls my wife with me via a meta data storage, but with the data already known Criminal in the Islamist environment in a sub-optimal deal. Carefully formulated.

I would like to try to be the security agencies to be fair. Because it is difficult to say whether, despite the publicly known Numbers, perhaps, but an acceptable success rate in the fight against terrorist murders. Prevented attacks are not always made public, for example for reasons of the protection of whistle-blowers. Apart from that, of course, raids like a few days ago in a Salafist mosque in Berlin could theoretically choke acts prior to specific planning in the Bud.

But the pattern in the known data are clear: Young men, immigrants or with immigrant background from Muslim countries, almost all police known and gewaltaffin, because they were to the IS threats, the violent crime perpetrated or at least authorities, well-known threats of Violence debates.

Seven identities – so what?

the path to The Islamist bombers not-so-obviously on an ideological crime that I believe me in some of the assessments of the authorities violently on the head: Amri does not act “because of its drug trafficking as a typical Islamist Terrorist”. The Berlin police to justify the adjustment of the Monitoring of anise Amri, three months before his stroke. It is, therefore, incomprehensible, precisely because the authority, said the Berlin LKA, even, to observe the “partial merger of the Islamists – with the drugs-scene” since the mid-2015.

In almost all of the 22 cases, there were, at any time, in addition to criminal violence, an affinity for the machinations of a extremism suspected in at least one of the bombers, with two exceptions:

The Islamist murderer of the 14. July 2016 in nice, which was as criminal and violent, known, but not as Islamist. The Islamist murderer of the 1. October 2017 in Marseille as well.

but particularly the second case, Ahmed Hanachi, an inner absurdity. Because Hanachi was not only arrested twelve Times, including due to acts of violence – he had officially identified the seven identities. His brother was known for two years as IS fighters in Syria. Nevertheless, Hanachi was left of the day before the attack, because he was not on any alert list. Me is beyond perfect, as with these data, not all of the warning lights come on. What good is a Bad or a threat file, if a highly criminal man with seven identities, and a IS-fighter in the family? Despite the almost extreme Monitoring, the reasons, in France, exactly from Terrorism long ago?

case Amri: Only the tip of the pan-European fiasco-iceberg

In contrast to my surveys from March 2016 to may 2017 this year, however, a new. Though again, all of the suicide attacks with the participation of known to police, violence-savvy persons have been committed, were found for the first time since 2014 is also Co-assassins, who were the authorities apparently unknown to:

the third of The three assassins of the attack on 3. June 2017 in London was not entered until then, even the police in appearance. The terrorist cell of the killings in Barcelona on may 17. August 2017 was composed of a as an extremist and terrorist suspect known Imam, and seven up until then, apparently, officially unknown to the young men who led a double life.

That makes me feel better not really, because the deeper I look into the many cases, the more disturbing the connections become, and the harder I do it to me, rule of law, trust in the security apparatus to regain. Of course, it is always wiser – but the startling authorities, failure of the Islamist murderers of Berlin, Anis Amri, appears only as the tip of the pan-European fiasco iceberg.

The head of the Berlin LKA forced to speak of “so many faults, so many shortcomings,” even though security agencies known to be not outstanding, are good at Admitting failure. Here is a really small selection (If you have to be in a good mood, read the timeline of the Amri-failure of the “Berliner Morgenpost”):

two police authorities overlooked in the Review of the Smartphones of Amri a photo where he is posing with a gun. The authorities had at least a V-man in Amris direct surroundings (you are concealed then, as a precaution). Amris Monitoring is terminated, because there are not enough forces are available, without informing competent authorities, such as the Prosecutor’s office. Amri is taken with two fake passports, firmly, but comes freely as a known threat yet again the next day. Again and again Demands between authorities will not be answered, information is not forwarded or concealed, absurd misperceptions committed. The Moroccan secret service reports of weeks before the attack, the Berlin LKA that Amri plane with IS-sympathizers transport and “a project”. It happens: nothing.

Forget the Top offenders in the offenders data Bank

enter became – relative to Europe – dealing with such dangerous, Islamist men in the last two years, more prudent, smarter, better? The Islamist assassination of Strasbourg, a few days ago, does not necessarily imply it. Chérif Chekatt was known as extremely violent, a fabulous 27 Times for bloodcurdling 67 proven offences, a criminal record, in France, Switzerland and Germany condemned, he was under surveillance by the French domestic intelligence service, he was on the French Terror alert list (“Fiche”). And there Chekatt was not someone, he was, according to the French authorities as “one of the Islamist Top-offenders”, radicalized in prison. The authorities in Germany have led him, but not as the Islamists, but only as an ordinary Criminal. Boom.

How is this possible? Although at least half of the Islamist suicide bombers of the last few years and operated cross-border activities, there is not even a common Definition of “Islamist Gefährdern” within the EU. Worse still, There is, since 2001, an EU-wide “Counter-Terrorism Group”, which operates in The Hague in a database. But France had failed, Chekatt to enter, so he stood in the Schengen information system only as “offenders”.

Yes, it really is true: You can be in Strasbourg, one of the worst Islamist threat in France and in Germany – air line 250 metres from Strasbourg – is an ordinary burglar. It seems to me simply, as the authorities in Europe had learned from the case of Amri, two years ago, too much, and that makes me very angry.