History 21/02/20 What the red army’s victory over the Germans ended in defeat
In the genre of alternative history is a popular theme of the missed opportunity of the Wehrmacht in the Second world war. However, the red army was not less, if not more missed opportunities, which, whether they are used considerably closer to win.
the liberation of the Crimea in the winter of 1941/42 G.
on 26 December 1941 began the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of Soviet troops. Within a week the red army managed to seize a large bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula. Created favorable conditions for the liberation of the Crimea. The commander of the 11th German army in the Crimea, General Manstein recalled:
“More determined opponent could have a rapid breakthrough in Dzhankoi to paralyse all supplies of the army… But the enemy failed to use the favorable moment… Even with a triple superiority in strength, the enemy did not dare to brave the deep operation, which could lead to the destruction of the 11th army.”
the Soviet command did not initially set ourselves such goals. It only wanted to possess a base for future operations and divert German forces besieging Sevastopol. When it tried to resume the offensive in may 1942, the Germans forestalled him, and struck the Soviet forces a major defeat, which began a series of our failures in the summer of 1942.
the encirclement of German forces at Vyazma in January-February 1942
during the winter counteroffensive and the subsequent General offensive of the red army in the winter of 1941/42 German troops West of Moscow retreated to a distance of just over 100 km from our capital. Was more successful Soviet offensive against the flanks of German army group “Center”. In mid-January 1942, troops of the Kalinin front, beating Rzhev from the West, came to the area of the City. At the same time the left wing of the Western front came to the area Yukhnovand.
I Created the background in order to close the encirclement of German troops by blows from two sides on Vyazma. In the “pot” got 3rd and 4th Panzer army, part of the forces of the 9th and 4th field armies of the enemy more troops than subsequently appeared in the ring at Stalingrad. Stalin ordered the 39th army of the Kalinin front to block the escape routes of the Germans to the West, and the 11th cavalry corps to cut the railroad West of Vyazma. At the same time, the operational group of General Belov was supposed to break to Vyazma from the South-East. South-West of Vyazma was to land paratroopers.
Fulfilling the directives of the Bet and commanders of fronts, the 11th cavalry corps, January 26, cut the roads leading from Vyazma to the West, and part of the group Belov 30 Jan joined 12 km South of Vyazma from the 8th brigade of the 4th airborne corps, landed on January 27. Communication of army group “Center” were cut.
But the forces that produced the environment was insufficient to enable it to provide. Take Vyazma failed. The Germans firmly held pockets of resistance. The shock of the Soviet force was too detached from the main mass of troops with which they were connected only narrow corridors. In the coming days, the Germans carried out counterattacks on the flanks of these corridors and restored their communication and tried to encircle the Soviet troops themselves, in turn, were surrounded, which heroically fought until may 1942.
the Main reason for the failure of the Soviet offensive at Vyazma was the lack of power, participated in the encirclement of German forces. Stavka put the red army in the winter of 1941/42 G. offensive problems on many fronts: Leningrad, Donbass, etc. to Strengthen the group of Soviet forces where there has been the biggest success, at the crucial moment turned out to be nowhere.
“Big ring” at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus
Operation Uranus to encircle German forces at Stalingrad was the first part of the plan of the Soviet winter campaign 1942/43, Then followed to carry out the operation “Saturn”, or “Ring,” and a blow to Rostov to cut off in the North Caucasus, the forces of the 1st Panzer and 17th armies the German field.
When the Soviet troops destroyed the opposing part of the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies on the flanks of the Stalingrad group, between them and Rostov remained of the enemy. Moving the Soviet forces had a free hand to develop the offensive further. However, as now recognized by many historians, the Soviet command during this period was concerned with the creation of a dense outer and inner ring of the encirclement, worrying more about defense. The attack on Rostov direction only resumed on December 16.
meanwhile, the enemy had time to concentrate the troops and warn the offensive, inflicting 12 Dec blow to deblokady the 6th army Paulus at Stalingrad. The German offensive was initially successful, forcing the Soviet commanders to abandon far-reaching plans and to reorient the front of the offensive from the southwest (Rostov) to the South-East (to the rear of the deblocking group). Unlocking the German attack was disrupted, and Soviet troops, in turn, missed the opportunity to surround another German group, larger than in Stalingrad.
Then, in January 1943, Soviet troops attempted an attack on Bataisk to cut off the retreat of the German 1st Panzer army in the North Caucasus, but have not succeeded.
the encirclement of the 1st Panzer army in Western Ukraine in the spring of 1944.
during the offensive in Western Ukraine in March 1944, troops of the 1st Ukrainian front commanded by Zhukov, deep left flank of the German 1st Panzer army. By the end of March 26 she was surrounded by the North-East of Kamenets-Podolsk. External front of encirclement was established at a distance of 80-100 km from the inner.
the Commander of the 1st tank army of General Hube was going to break through to the South, to Romania. However, the commander of army group “South” Manstayn has chosen for deblocking strike the Western direction. To meet the HB was to attack the 4th tank army. The result of the operation, held from 4 to 7 April, the front, Soviet troops were rapidly broken, and the 1st Panzer army almost without loss out of the boiler.
mistake of the Soviet command in this operation was the fact that she was not attracted by the neighboring forces of the 2nd Ukrainian front. In addition, the command of the 1st Ukrainian front had failed to unravel the intentions of the enemy. The direction of the unlocking impact was for the Soviet troops by surprise.
Yaroslav Butakov
Source:
© Russian Seven
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