The battle of Stalingrad: why the USSR had forgotten the battle after the war

History 15/02/20 the battle of Stalingrad: why the USSR forgot this battle immediately after the war

In Soviet times, any description of the battle of Stalingrad in the part that concerned the operation to encircle the German forces, necessarily included the mention that a Soviet attack was unexpected for the enemy. It was stressed that secret from the enemy could concentrate a large force, about which German intelligence did not know. You can read about it in the five-volume “History of the great Patriotic war”, and in the twelve-volume “history of the Second world war”, and in the book of academician A. M. Samsonov’s the battle of Stalingrad. As proof of Soviet historians cited the words of the chief of staff of the operational management of the Supreme command of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General Jodl: “We watched a large concentration of Russian forces on the flank of the 6th army (the don). We absolutely had no idea of the strength of Russian troops in the area. Previously, there was nothing, and suddenly was hit a large force, critical”.

But even in Soviet times, many wondered how could the German command did not provide for the possibility of this surgery and to take measures to protect themselves from attacks from the flanks? After all, to understand that any deep broken through the enemy troops to surround a blow to the flags, no need to be a military genius knows that any graduate of a military school. However, in Soviet time the idea to encircle the Germans in Stalingrad were portrayed as “brilliant insight” of Marshal Zhukov. Although in all similar situations, the Red Army always tried to surround German troops where they are deeply penetrated into our defenses. Since 1941, when the same bugs were trying to encircle the Germans in the area of El’ninskogo the ledge. It was further the encirclement of the Wehrmacht in the area of Demjansk, which failed because the Germans struck the hallway and continued to fight. The huge overhang in the area of Rzhev and Vyazma the Red Army also tried to “cut off” during the whole of 1942.

In this situation is to say that the Wehrmacht could not wait attempts to encircle his troops, deeply wedged in the Volga region, only the people who count, that the naive audience at all ready to believe blindly. That took place in the Soviet Union, with the reservation that not all believed. Just to Express a different opinion was forbidden, it would still no one heard.

In the post-Soviet period there were many historical works in which the war describes is not in the mainstream of Soviet censorship. The battle of Stalingrad, ironically, attention has not been paid after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Was just a book A. Panin “Stalingrad. The forgotten battle”, where on the basis of documentary data was described by the real story of the events at Stalingrad.

of Course, Colonel-General Jodl is a direct witness. But phrases taken out of context, can often be explained by anything. Moreover, it turns out that yodeling is contrary to all the actions of the command of the 6th army and army group “B”. Which allocated reserves in order to respond to the blows of the red Army. And in those areas, where he suffered a “sudden” impact.

throughout September and October the Soviet army almost continuously attacked the Germans North and South of Stalingrad, aiming to encircle the 6th army of Paulus. In November continued the same, was just dealt another blow and the South-Western front of the bridgehead in the area of Serafimovich, where the Fort was held by Romanian troops.

Since September, and in October the Soviet attacks on the flanks of the Stalingrad group, the Germans managed to successfully repel, and in November was counting on the same result. The German command believed that even in the case of the breakthrough of Soviet troops, the situation could repeat Rzhev, breaking through the front when the red Army came in OKrugene and was defeated.

For this purpose, the army group “In the” allocated reserves of movable joints. Another thing is that these reserves by November was too weak. Due to the overwhelming overall superiority of the red Army, the Soviet high command to the beginning of operation “Uranus” has concentrated enormous power in the most important areas.

In the band breakthrough of the Stalingrad front (not including troops in the city) had 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, 1 tank and 1 mechanized corps, 4th tank brigade. Up to 500 tanks. Against them were 5 Romanian and 1 German infantry division, 2nd Romanian cavalry division, 1 infantry German division (it has 29 tanks). In the band the don front against 24 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 6th separate tank brigades (400 tanks) was defended by 5 infantry, 2 mechanized infantry and 2 tank German divisions (125 tanks). It is important to note that the German divisions in November was reduced to the size of the regiment and was two to three times weaker than the Soviet. In the band of the South-Western front vs 8 infantry and 2 cavalry Romanian divisions had 18 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, 3 tank corps, not counting the separate brigades. Only 728 tanks.

In-depth, behind the Romanian troops, was the 48th motorized corps (up to 100 Romanian and 40 German tanks), which had to try to fend off the Soviet breakthrough armored corps. The assertion that the German command did not expect the Soviet offensive, including in the area of Serafimovich, refuted by their own actions. The matter is that though the Germans knew that the Soviet troops will undertake new attempts to encircle the 6th army and knew the possible areas of the Soviet offensive, to do something more they simply do not have the strength.

Cyril Shishkin

© Russian Seven

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