In the end, the embarrassment still has something good. It is certainly a mistake that Emmanuel Macron had to wait five years for an adequate German response to his Europe speech at the Sorbonne in 2017.
But would first Angela Merkel and then Olaf Scholz have offered him anything of substance before the Ukraine war? The way the grand coalition, but also the German public, saw the world at the time, they interpreted Macron’s call for a stronger Europe as a desire to make the EU a vehicle for French politics and for more money from German coffers.
A geostrategic role for the EU was not one of Berlin’s priorities. Neither is the preparation for serious conflicts with Russia and China.
Vladimir Putin’s attack changed that. Three days later, Scholz initially ordered a turning point in Germany. In his speech in Prague he proclaimed that for all of Europe.
Here as there, safety and defensiveness are the focus. In both cases, the first prerequisite is a comprehensive rethink. In the past, European integration was seen as an inward-looking peace project. The EU has thus achieved something admirable for its citizens.
But if it wants to preserve freedom, security and democracy, it must become an EU that is geopolitically capable of acting and that can also ensure independence and stability externally. And forces the autocrats with credible deterrents to take them seriously.
Military isn’t everything. But because Germany and many western EU partners neglected this in times of peace, the deficits are greatest there.
Many nation states can no longer afford what is necessary on their own. The EU can’t do it yet because its members don’t coordinate effectively and don’t pool their resources. Scholz would like to set up an independent council of EU defense ministers, set up a European air defense system and better coordinate the defense industry.
In previous years, Germany itself often stood in the way of the rethinking that Scholz is now demanding. Before the war, Josep Borrell, EU envoy for common foreign and security policy, wanted to help Ukraine train its soldiers like the US was doing.
Berlin refused. This is an unnecessary provocation by Russia. Now the chancellor is offering much more extensive military assistance, including permanent responsibility for Ukraine’s artillery and air defenses.
This pragmatic tone, which does not preach airy wishful thinking about a united Europe that is actually quite divided, but strives for real-political “de facto solidarity”, gives the Prague speech its importance. Citizens expect an EU that delivers. You have a feel for what works and a memory for empty promises.
In various fields, the EU learned quickly, sometimes painfully slowly, and sometimes not at all. During the pandemic, after making initial mistakes, she started buying vaccines together, because this is how her market power comes into play. Why not now with gas?
In the Corona recession, she decided on a recovery program and took out joint debt for the first time. She is divided on asylum and migration policy and on safeguarding the rule of law and cannot find any effective means.
A core problem is the decision-making mechanisms of the EU. If it is to include other countries and grow to more than 30 members, the requirement for unanimity in all important areas must be removed.
Not every country may have a veto right. This is already giving China and Russia the chance to block the EU by exerting influence.
Scholz should have been clearer there. It is not enough to call for a gradual transition to more majority decisions. Without internal reform, his European plans will hardly become reality. It belongs to the core of the turning point in time.
